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ABSTRACT: Public discussions of science are often marred by two pernicious phenomena: a widespread 
rejection of scientific findings (e.g., the reality of anthropogenic climate change, the conclusion that vaccines do 
not cause autism, or the validity of evolutionary theory), coupled with an equally common acceptance of 
pseudoscientific notions (e.g., homeopathy, psychic readings, telepathy, tall tales about alien abductions, and so 
forth). The typical reaction by scientists and science educators is to decry the sorry state of science literacy among 
the general public, and to call for more science education as the answer to both problems. But the empirical 
evidence concerning the relationship between science literacy, rejection of science and acceptance of 
pseudoscience is mixed at best. In this chapter I argue that—while certainly important—efforts at increasing 
public knowledge of science (science education) need to be complemented by attention to common logical 
fallacies (philosophy), cognitive biases and dissonance (psychology), and the role of ideological commitments 
(sociology). Even this complex, multi-disciplinary approach to science education will likely only yield measurable 
results in the very long term. Meanwhile science remains, as Carl Sagan famously put it, a candle in the dark, 
delicate and in need of much nurturing. 
KEYWORDS: science literacy, science education, philosophy, psychology, sociology, pseudoscience. 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE ACCIDENTAL PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL 
Most academics do not engage in public outreach, for a variety of reasons. First off, it is at 
least implicitly discouraged by the very structure of the academy, where one’s career is 
advanced (in decreasing order of importance, regardless of what anyone would tell you) by 
one’s success in research or scholarship (measured by peer-reviewed publications and grants), 
one’s teaching, and finally one’s service. It would be nice if at least the somewhat vague 
category of “service” included outreach lecturing and writing, but it is in fact pretty much 
confined to internal (and not really very useful) service, such as on departmental or college 
committees. 
 Second, many of us are simply never trained for public outreach (or teaching, for that 
matter), and do not know how to relate in an understandable and engaging way to laypeople. 
Contra a popular academic myth, there is no particular reason for there to be a strong 
correlation between one’s scholarly excellence in a highly technical field of expertise and 
one’s ability to communicate in a non-technical matter about the broader context in which that 
scholarly work flourishes or makes sense (Sperber, 2001). 
 Consequently, until 1997 I was yet another example of a non-engaged academic, 
pursuing my first tenure track job at the University of Tennessee, within the specialty field of 
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evolutionary biology (and more specifically the study of gene-environment interactions in 
plant model systems). But then something happened that made me pay attention and turned me 
into the accidental public intellectual that I have become since. A few months earlier, in March 
1996, the Tennessee state legislature had attempted to pass a bill that would have ensured equal 
time for creationism in science classes throughout that state’s public high schools. A New York 
Times article published at the time summarized the idea in this manner:  
“If evolution is true, then it has nothing to fear from some other theory being taught; the truth will 
prevail,” State Senator David Fowler, a Republican from Chattanooga, argued on the Tennessee 
Senate floor this week. “But if intelligent design is the truth, then God forbid we should not teach it 
to our children.” (Applebome, 1996) 
The bill actually died in committee (though, unfortunately, the TN legislators were at it again 
in 2012, this time successfully (Thompson, 2012)). But during those months I had awoken to a 
reality that perhaps should not have surprised me to begin with: I was now living (and 
operating professionally, as an evolutionary biologist!) in the middle of the Bible Belt, in a 
country characterized by one of the most religious-puritanical attitudes among modern 
advanced societies (Uhlmann Poehlmanb, Tannenbaumc, & Bargh, 2012). As a reaction, I 
started one of the very earliest “Darwin Day” events on campus, an outreach program aiming 
at explaining to the public the nature of science and at exploring the relationship between 
science and religion. It has since become a major international event, with hundreds of 
locations worldwide every year (darwinday.org). 
 Once I got started, I realized that public outreach ought to be an important part of 
what academics should be doing, in part because they are among the best-positioned 
individuals in our society to function as public intellectuals, to aid the layperson—in the words 
of Noam Chomsky—in the pursuit of a course in “intellectual self-defense” (Baillargeon, 
2008). This quickly led me to maintaining a blog devoted to science and philosophy for the 
public (rationallyspeaking.org), as well as to publish a number of advocacy books concerned 
with pseudoscience (Pigliucci, 2002, 2010). Most recently, and to my own amusement, my 
scholarship and outreach converged, with the co-editing of a new book on the philosophy, 
history, and sociology of the so-called demarcation problem (Popper, 1957), i.e. the conceptual 
divide between science and pseudoscience (Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013). What follows is a 
summary of the lessons I have learned while putting together the book and during the now 
more than fifteen years devoted to interacting with the public, initially as a scientist, and more 
recently as a philosopher. 
2. NOT JUST SCIENCE EDUCATION 
It is common for scientists and science educators to bemoan the fact that the American public 
is not scientifically literate, a state of affairs that is often blamed for much misunderstanding of 
science and embracing of pseudoscience. Indeed, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science thinks that science literacy is so crucial that they have launched an 
ambitious “2061” project to improve it substantially (www.project2061.org/publications/bsl). 
There are good reasons to think that scientific literacy matters (Hazen, 2002), including so that 
people can better appreciate the world around us and, most crucially, make intelligent 
decisions about their lives—including who they vote for when it comes to public issues 
informed by science. 
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 However, scientific literacy cannot be the whole story. A report by the National 
Science Foundation pointed out that both Americans and Europeans do not “have a firm grasp 
of basic scientific facts and concepts, nor do they have an understanding of the scientific 
process,” (2004, p. 7-15) which makes it puzzling why, for instance, denial of evolution is a 
popular stance in the US but not in Europe (Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006). 
 Indeed, a number of years ago one of my students and I carried out a preliminary 
study of the relationship between scientific literacy and belief in pseudoscience, and the results 
were not at all encouraging (Johnson & Pigliucci, 2004). For instance, while we found a 
(small, but statistically significant) effect of major (science vs. non-science) in the amount of 
factual knowledge of science that undergraduate students were able to master, we uncovered 
no significant differences between science and non-science majors in either conceptual 
understanding of science or belief in pseudoscience. (Interestingly, and contra popular lore, 
there was also no effect of gender on either science understanding or acceptance of 
pseudoscience.) 
 A more recent and much larger survey confirmed our results (Impey, Buxner, 
Antonellis, Johnson, & King, 2011): 10,000 students taking astronomy classes as part of their 
general education requirements were tested, and it turned out that belief in pseudoscience was 
high in the sample, that students’ degree of science literacy was only marginally better than in 
the general population, and—most crucially—that there was no correlation between their 
science literacy and their acceptance of pseudoscience. The authors also found that over a 
period of two decades there was no measurable improvement in students’ science literacy. 
 This is not exactly surprising to people who have spent years “in the field,” so to 
speak, actually talking to (and sometimes debating) proponents of pseudoscientific notions. 
Contrary to popular belief among academics (and scientists in particular) these people are both 
intelligent and knowledgeable about science. Take the issue of creationism, for instance. I have 
debated the likes of Duane Gish (Institute for Creation Science) and Michael Behe and William 
Dembski (both associated with the Discovery Institute), among others. Gish and Behe have a 
PhD in biochemistry, and Dembski has academic credentials in both mathematics and 
philosophy. They know far more about natural selection, the chemistry of life, and so forth 
than most, and yet they subscribe to untenable notions of young earth creationism (Gish) and 
Intelligent Design creationism (Behe and Dembski). This observation is not limited to the 
leaders of these movements either, as a good number of the rank and file creationists (or 
paranormalists, or climate change deniers, you name it) that I’ve met during the years are also 
well-versed in the basics of science, and can discourse on points of scientific method and even 
philosophy of science. 
 None of this argues that science literacy is not a worthy goal, but it certainly points 
out that—in itself—more general science education is not likely to significantly ameliorate the 
problem. The implication is that there must be other, so far less explored, factors playing into 
so much misunderstanding of science and acceptance of pseudoscience by the general public. 
My suggestion is that we need to consider three other, interconnected, spheres of influence: 
philosophy (particularly as it concerns critical thinking and informal logical fallacies), 
psychology (pertinent to people’s proneness to engage in cognitive biases and cognitive 





3. FROM EDUCATION TO PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Professional skeptics—i.e., people who spend their time debunking all sorts of pseudoscientific 
claims—will quickly point out that believers in pseudoscience commit an orgy of logical 
fallacies, particularly of the informal kind (e.g., www.theskepticsguide.org/resources/ 
logicalfallacies.aspx). Indeed, a recent project by Richardson, Smith, and Meaden (2012) has 
cataloged the most common fallacies and allows internet browsers to paste a fallacy-specific 
link to any blog, article, or commentary they find around the internet (hence the title of the 
project: “Your Logical Fallacy Is...”). 
 Examples are in abundance. Consider just the following small sample (more in 
Baillargeon (2006)): 
Hasty generalization: “Acupuncture works; my brother stopped smoking by seeing an 
acupuncturist.” 
Ad Populum: “Most people believe in astrology, so there must be something to it.” 
False dilemma: “Either medicine can explain how someone was cured, or it is a miracle.” 
Appeal to ignorance: “No one has ever proved that UFOs do not exist, so they might exist.” 
Red herring: During a discussion on global warming someone says: “What you really have to worry 
about is a government too prone to regulating the economy, which will keep people from being 
decently employed.” 
 Post hoc, ergo propter hoc: “I was wearing a red sweater when I won at the casino. If I wear the 
red sweater again, I will win again.” (Richardson et al., 2012) 
And the list could go on and on. If we begin with the (empirically testable) assumption that 
awareness of logical fallacies helps people think more clearly about issues, then it follows that 
courses in critical thinking and informal reasoning may be significantly more effective than 
straightforward science education (though, of course, the two are not mutually exclusive; 
indeed, there is some evidence that inferential skills are affected both by general education and 
by specific knowledge (Franks, 1998; Zachos, Pruzek, & Hick, 2003)). 
 However, this cannot be the end of the matter. It has become better known during the 
last several years of research in psychology that people have a natural tendency toward a 
number of cognitive biases, several of which actually explain why some of the above 
mentioned logical fallacies are so common and persistent. Take the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy, for instance. This is the mistake of inferring a causal connection between two events 
simply on the ground that one followed the other (typically within a short period of time). 
Statisticians constantly warn us that correlation is not the same as causation, and yet this type 
of elementary mistake in logic is arguably at the foundation of much superstitious behavior. A 
plausible (if difficult to test empirically (Kaplan, 2002)) argument can be made, however, that 
a cognitive bias favoring quick causal inference evolved because it was fitness-enhancing in 
ancient humans. 
 Moreover, Skinner (1948) famously showed that human beings are not the only 
animals to engage in superstitious behavior triggered by a false causal inference (although in 
the case of Skinner’s pigeons, presumably such inference was unconscious). He reported: 
 [O]ne bird was conditioned to turn counter-clockwise about the cage, making two or three turns 
between reinforcements. Another repeatedly thrust its head into one of the upper corners of the 
cage. A third developed a ‘tossing’ response, as if placing its head beneath an invisible bar and 
lifting it repeatedly. Two birds developed a pendulum motion of the head and body, in which the 
head was extended forward and swung from right to left with a sharp movement followed by a 
somewhat slower return. The body generally followed the movement and a few steps might be 
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taken when it was extensive. Another bird was conditioned to make incomplete pecking or brushing 
movements directed toward but not touching the floor. (Skinner, 1948, p. 168) 
 The problem, however, is that human beings persist in such behaviors much longer 
than experimental animals, who typically abandon their superstitious habits when they 
repeatedly fail to deliver the goods. For instance, work carried out by G.L. Wolford at 
Dartmouth (summarized by Gazzaniga, 2003) employed a test in which the subject is guessing 
whether a light will appear on the bottom or on the top of a computer screen. The setup is such 
that the light appears on top the majority of the times, but the sequence is random (i.e., there is 
a bias in the random appearances of the light). Rats quickly learn to maximize their 
performance, simply by limiting themselves to hit the top button. Human beings, however, 
think they can infer the rule behind the sequence, performing significantly worse than the rats, 
on average. So much for Homo sapiens. In all fairness, though, if the subjects of Wolford’s 
experiment were told what was going on they would quickly adjust their behavior as a result of 
understanding, an option not available to the rats. 
 There are a number of other cognitive biases that are well-known to interfere with our 
critical thinking abilities, and that accordingly are increasingly taught alongside an 
understanding of logical fallacies. For instance, people habitually over-rely on their memories, 
so much so that 25% of participants in a survey were convinced that they got lost for long 
periods of time in a shopping mall when they were children (Baillargeon, 2008). If true, this 
would be a phenomenon of epidemic proportions, which would scarcely go unnoticed among 
the security personnel of shopping centers. 
 Our unjustified trust in our perception abilities has been well-documented as well, for 
instance in the cases of the unreliability of eye-witness testimony (Vidmar, Coleman Jr., & 
Newman, 2010) and in that of a number of standard and yet bewildering optical illusions 
(Ditzinger, 2001). Interestingly, a common cognitive bias that leads to (or at least reinforces) 
pseudoscientific belief takes place when unreliable perception combines with an innate 
tendency to see patterns in the world around us (another example of the human hyper-tendency 
to infer causality on the basis of scant data). In 2004, for instance, the face of the Virgin Mary 
“found” on a piece of toast fetched a bewildering $28,000 when sold, a type of (expensive!) 
cognitive mistake that Hadjikhani, Kveraga, Naik, and Ahlfors (2009) traced to an early 
activation of face-specific areas of the cortex by “face-like” objects (though exactly what made 
that particular object face-like remains largely unexplored). 
 A classic example in the pseudoscientific literature is, of course, the famous “face on 
Mars,” allegedly discovered by NASA, but that clear images from the Mars Global Surveyor 
revealed to be simply an unusual configuration of a natural mesa, initially photographed at an 
angle that gave the (vague) impression of a giant sculpture of a human-like head on the surface 
of the red planet (Fraknoi, 2003). Naturally, the solution of the mystery does not seem to have 
done much to abate belief in a NASA-inspired conspiracy to hide the truth from the 
unsuspecting public. 
 One cannot leave even a cursory discussion of the psychological underpinnings of 
pseudoscience without mentioning a well-known concept in psychology that helps us make 
sense of a lot of the phenomenology concerning pseudoscience, and which indeed was invoked 
initially precisely in the context of a pseudoscientific cult: cognitive dissonance. The phrase 
was famously coined by Leon Festinger and colleagues in 1956, in their When Prophecy Fails 
(Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956). 
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 Festinger et al. managed to infiltrate a cult growing around the pronouncements of one 
Dorothy Martin (initially identified in the book as “Marian Keech”). Martin claimed to be 
receiving messages from extraterrestrials from the (imaginary, as far as we know) planet 
Clarion. One day the message said that the world would end on December 21st, 1954. 
However, a group of flying saucers would pick up Miss Keech’s followers. As a direct 
consequence of their belief in Martin’s prophecies, many of those followers cut their ties with 
their families, quit their jobs, sold their possessions, and joined the wait. Problem was, the 
appointed date arrived and (predictably) nothing happened. Hours of tension followed, until at 
4:45am the following morning, Martin announced the reception of another transmission from 
the Clarionians: the faith of the believers had saved the world, and no flying saucers rescue 
mission was needed after all! 
 Now, one would expect that Martin’s followers would be angry and upset, and 
perhaps would go to the police, or sue Martin for all her worth. Instead, the majority of the cult 
members began to spread word of the good news, attempting (and succeeding, for a while) to 
make new disciples. Festinger et al.’s (1956) interpretation of what was going on was that too 
many of Martin’s followers had invested too much at that point, both emotionally and 
materially. Now they were faced with the choice of either facing up to the fact that they had 
been gullible fools, or of telling the world (and themselves) that they were valiant heroes 
whose courageous behavior had actually saved the world. Apparently, for some people this is 
an easy choice: they avoid the rabbit hole and gladly take the blue pill. 
 Unfortunately, the Clarionian debacle was far from the last example of the genre. As 
recently as 2011 a new cultish movement was started by Evangelical Biblical literalist Harold 
Camping, with similar dynamics (and outcomes) to the classic Martin case (Bartlett, 2012). 
Just as in the 1950s, followers of Camping firmly believed their leader, who had predicted the 
end of the world by earthquakes, based on his (unorthodox and unfounded) reading of the 
books of Daniel and Revelation. Once again, they had to deal with the undeniable fact that the 
world did not, in fact, end on the announced date of May 21, 2011. And their reactions were 
remarkably similar to those of the followers of Martin. Here are some excerpts from Bartlett’s 
(2012) article on the aftermath of the cult:  
With less than three months to the day of Christ’s return, I desire to spend more time studying the 
Bible and sounding the trumpet warning of this imminent judgment… 
 Based on everything we know, and when you look at the timelines, you look at the 
evidence—these aren’t the kind of things that just happen. They correlate too strongly for it not to 
be important…. 
 Even if it’s 99.9 percent, that extra .1 percent makes it not certain. It’s like the weather. If 
it’s 60 percent, it may or may not rain. But in this case we’re saying 100 percent it will come. God 
with a consuming fire is coming to bring judgment and destroy the world…. 
 “Of course I’ll be disappointed if it doesn’t happen, but I feel like God’s not going to let us 
down.”  
And, most revealingly: “I turned my back on the world. I can’t afford to doubt.” 
 Just as was argued by Festinger et al. (1956), however, cognitive dissonance has its 
limits, and some of Camping’s followers apparently exceeded them. One of the people he 
interviewed told Bartlett (2012):  
After October 22, I said ‘You know what? I think I was part of a cult. My wife and I joke that when 
my kids get older they’re going to say that we’re the crazy parents who believed the world was 
going to end.  
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Another wrote: “definitely lost an incredible amount of faith. It makes me wonder just how 
malleable our minds can be. It all seemed so real, like it made so much sense, but it wasn’t 
right. It leaves a lot to think about.” Indeed. 
4. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN PSEUDOSCIENCE 
The last aspect of the problem of misunderstanding of science and acceptance of 
pseudoscience I wish to briefly discuss is perhaps the most difficult to handle: the role of 
strong ideological commitments in how we filter just about everything else, including what 
should otherwise be relatively straightforward scientific information. 
 I will illustrate the issue with a specific example, concerning self-styled professional 
skeptics and the question of anthropogenic climate change. I am referring to the popular (now 
no longer airing) television show “Bullshit!,” hosted by magicians Penn Gillette and Raymond 
Teller. The show was funny, if often crass because of Penn’s tendency to curse, and very 
intelligently put together. Each episode examined some pseudoscientific claim and proceeded 
to debunk it with a combination of investigative journalism and empirical demonstrations. 
Penn and Teller do not pretend to be doing rigorous science—after all, it is a television 
program meant to entertain—but their antics also manage to educate, and I actually use them 
regularly in a class I teach on the nature of science, to provide my students with what turns out 
to be a very effective combination of laughs and food for serious thought. 
 Even Penn and Teller, however, sometimes get it spectacularly wrong, and it is 
instructive to examine one example because it vividly illustrates the role of ideology (in this 
case, political, though it may just as well be religious) in public science debate. Episode 13 of 
the first season of Bullshit! aired in 2003 and tackled the problem of climate change 
(McLaughlin, Moldave, & Small). The choice of topic by Penn and Teller may appear strange 
at first glance, since—despite the scientific discussions and the sociopolitical controversy—
atmospheric physics certainly is no pseudoscience. It takes only a few minutes of background 
research to begin to guess why they chose to be skeptical of global warming: Penn Gillette is a 
well-known libertarian and a fellow of the Cato Institute, a think tank that has repeatedly taken 
positions against the emerging scientific consensus on global warming. The Cato Institute, it 
should be added, is funded in part by the Exxon-Mobil Corporation, not exactly a neutral 
player in discussions about energy production and use. Of course, the suspicion of bias is not 
enough to condemn Penn and Teller’s treatment of climate change, but one’s baloney 
detector’s alert level should go up a couple of additional notches once a few more things 
become apparent from the broadcast. To begin with, Penn and Teller set up the episode by 
pitting oil-industry lobbyists against hippie college protesters to make their case that the 
climate change movement is a sort of New Age irrational belief. The only credentialed 
academic to speak on the program is economist Bjorn Lomborg (2001), a notorious skeptic of 
global warming (and not an atmospheric physicist). 
 Things became worse as the show transitioned from a clearly imbalanced presentation 
to outright misrepresentation of the debate. One of the guests was Jerry Taylor (of the above 
mentioned Cato Institute), who said  
In the mid ‘70s we were told pollution is going to cause a new ice age . . . The very same scientists 
who argued an ice age was coming because of industrial pollution then shifted gears and argued 
industrial pollution will bring on a greenhouse warming world with virtually no breath in between. 
(McLaughlin, Moldave, & Small, 2003). 
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This is simply false, as the idea of a temporary cooling of the earth’s temperature was 
advanced in the popular press (not in academic, peer-reviewed journals), prompted by 
speculations about the massive injection of aerosols in the atmosphere. To compare a few 
magazine articles with the overwhelming scientific literature on global warming is a joke, and 
not a particularly funny one, given what is at stake. 
 While the Bullshit! episode is obviously anecdotal (though, I think, actually 
representative of ideological distortions of science policy debates), there is also systematic 
research bearing on the issue of science and ideology. A comprehensive presentation of the 
cognitive science aspects of this research has been summarized recently for a broader public by 
Chris Mooney (2012), while Corey Robin (2011) has put together a more nuanced historical 
and philosophically informed analysis of conservative ideology. 
 Robin (2011) develops his central thesis by way of a number of case studies (from 
Thomas Hobbes to Ayn Rand), defending the idea that conservatism is, at core, a combination 
of reaction against challenges to power hierarchies as well as a strong sense of entitlement 
about private property. Interestingly, as some commentators have noted, Robin’s analysis helps 
making sense of the otherwise strange association between social conservatives and 
libertarians in the United States: while the latter endorse all sorts of positions that are abhorred 
by the former (e.g., legalization of drugs, prostitution, etc.), they share a sense of the 
inviolability, almost sacredness, of private property. It is this very thing that associates the 
otherwise progressive thinking and science endorsing Penn Gillette and Raymond Teller with 
the like of US Senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, who famously refers to climate change as a 
“hoax.” 
 Mooney’s (2012) book is a bit more problematic. The research discussed in it is 
certainly interesting, if not quite as definitive as the author boldly states, but one wonders what 
exactly we are learning from the general conclusion that conservatives’ and liberals’ brains are 
wired differently. Quite apart from the fact that the terms “conservative” and “liberal” are 
highly sensitive to their particular cultural and historical setting, and from the fact that they do 
not capture but a fraction of people’s attitudes toward political positions and ideologies, 
Mooney’s book is another example of a recent trend that belongs to the “This is Your Brain on 
X” genre (or cottage industry, depending on how one looks at it). Of course the brains of 
people who think differently about X will be different. How else could distinct ways of 
thinking and behaving be carried out by the human animal? In fact, I am willing to go so far as 
to agree with Mooney that there may even be some genetic factors that may bias people’s 
developmental psychology toward the conservative or progressive end of the spectrum (though 
then we enter the complex and empirically treacherous territory of gene-environment 
interactions (Pigliucci, 2001)).  
 The danger with Mooney’s and others’ approach to the biologization of ideology is 
that people will take the existence of genetic and/or neurobiological differences among groups 
as indicative of strong determinism (a position, to be fair, not endorsed by Mooney himself), 
quickly leading to the conclusion that nothing could therefore possibly change people’s minds. 
This would be a highly unfortunate outcome that would essentially negate the value of public 
discourse about pretty much anything at all we care about, and this in turn would be a serious 
blow to the very idea of democracy. Ideological biases are important to explain some people’s 
rejection of science and embracing of pseudoscience, but we need to thread carefully about the 
implications of research on ideology for the prospects of science education and even political 
progress. 
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5. CONCLUSION: THEN WHAT? 
Carl Sagan, in his influential The Demon-Haunted World (1996) famously referred to science 
as “a candle in the dark,” a precious thing, always in danger of being extinguished by a variety 
of threats, ignorance and superstition among others, but also ideological demagoguery in the 
service of political, religious, or corporate interests. 
 The analysis outlined above shows why Sagan got it right, and why the task 
confronting us is much more difficult than some may have thought. Rejection of science and 
belief in pseudoscience are not just the product of science illiteracy, more or less easily fixed 
by augmenting science teaching (and at any rate, certainly not by doing so primarily at the 
college level, or chiefly by way of more instruction about science facts as distinct from an 
understanding of science as a set of methods). It is much more complicated than that. Progress 
will be slow and will require much effort, and it will not be accomplished without taking 
seriously the contributions of philosophy (critical thinking, informal fallacies), psychology 
(sources and types of cognitive biases, cognitive dissonance), and sociology (roles and 
dynamics of ideological commitments). 
 It may very well be that the best that science educators, philosophers, and social 
scientists can do in the short run is to keep the candle lit, and that it takes a long view to remain 
confident of the possibility of progress (after all, a few centuries ago most people still believed 
in witches and demons...). Even so, what is at stake is well worth the fight. We just need to 
keep sharpening our tools along the way. 
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